



Global Trade Alert

GTA Monthly Roundup: July 2026

Written by Fiama Angeles and Ana Elena Sancho.

With the input of Marius Risse, Halit Harput, Chintan Jadwani, Andrey Eydlin, Vladislav Alifirov, Federica Miriani, Anttoni Asikainen, Nurmalia Mahmuda, Sisi Tang and Yiannos Lazzarotto.

Remain up-to-date on new developments with our free [notification service](#)

The Global Trade Alert is a pillar of the Swiss-based
[St. Gallen Endowment for Prosperity Through Trade](#)

**St.Gallen
Endowment**
for Prosperity through Trade

GTA Monthly Roundup: July 2026

A summary of trade and industrial policy activity worldwide

The Global Trade Alert team documented 1'008 trade and industrial policy developments during July 2026. Four trends emerge:

1. **The United States turned Section 301 from a country-specific remedy into a duty regime covering 60 economies.** USTR concluded its forced-labour investigations on 24 July. Duties of 10% or 12.5% apply across four rate categories. Five economies pay the rate inclusive of their MFN duty. The other 55 pay it in addition. Each rate follows the partner's own import legislation, not the scale of its trade with the United States.
2. **Washington gave old statutes new work.** The president used Section 338 for the first time to impose duties on Canada. He also used Section 101 of the Defense Production Act to allow for export controls on critical-minerals scrap.
3. **Ownership stakes are becoming a standard feature of industrial policy.** The US Department of Commerce signed CHIPS letters of intent worth USD 874m with seven compute-supply-chain firms. The United Kingdom took British Steel into public ownership under the Steel Industry (Nationalisation) Act 2026, removing Jingye Group as owner. Five Chinese subnational governments launched funds worth USD 3.3bn, investing through direct equity stakes. The Canada Growth Fund put USD 282.9m into Teck Resources to expand production capacity. The EIB committed up to USD 1.4bn to a fund of funds for European scaleups.
4. **Governments funded specific semiconductor supply-chain positions, from optics and memory architectures to packaging and laminates.** India approved Semicon 2.0, a USD 13.2bn programme spanning design, fabs, materials and packaging. US Commerce signed CHIPS letters of intent covering co-packaged optics for AI processors, ferroelectric AI memory, and advanced chip packaging. Japan pledged up to USD 998m to Tower Semiconductor Japan for a production expansion. Germany granted USD 403.9m for a silicon carbide epi-wafer plant and USD 245m to Vishay Siliconix Itzehoe. Thailand approved two copper-clad laminate plants worth USD 369.4m, one serving AI servers.

The GTA Monthly Roundup provides a rapid overview of changes in import barriers, export curbs, subsidies, and related industrial policy measures. It is organised by geography, beginning with the United States, China and the European Union. The final section briefly summarises developments in further regions covered by the GTA. Links to official sources are included in the references.

Jump to the section that interests you most:

[United States](#) | [China](#) | [European Union](#) | [Other Regions](#)

[Sign up here](#) to receive every Monthly Roundup.

United States

The United States concluded its Section 301 investigations into forced-labour imports and levied additional tariffs on Brazilian and Canadian goods. Washington also expanded CHIPS Act funding, authorised future export restrictions on recoverable critical minerals, revoked its authorisation for Iranian petroleum trade, and tightened procurement rules for defence-critical materials. The GTA team documented 143 new interventions during the last four weeks.

Export Restrictions

The Administration used section 101 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 to authorise future adoption of [export restrictions on recoverable critical minerals and materials](#). Specified goods include black mass, end-of-life products, rare-earth permanent magnets, and other waste and scrap containing critical minerals.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) revoked [transactions involving carrier vessels](#). As a result, no new loading of Iranian origin crude oil, petrochemical products, or petroleum products is authorised on or after 7 July 2026.

Import Restrictions

The Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) concluded its Section 301 investigations into 60 economies' failure to prohibit imports of forced-labour goods, imposing ad valorem duties of 10% and 12.5%. The duties were effective as of 24 July 2026 and structured across four rate categories. Economies that ban forced-labour imports, that committed to such a ban in an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade, or that operate a partial regime now pay 10%. This affected seventeen economies, among them the [United Kingdom](#), [Argentina](#), [Mexico](#) and [Cambodia](#). The [European Union](#) and [Chinese Taipei](#) also qualify for 10%, applied net of a product's most-favoured-nation duty. [Japan](#), [South Korea](#) and [Switzerland](#) receive the same net-of-MFN treatment at 12.5%. The remaining 38 economies, including [Costa Rica](#), [the Dominican Republic](#), [and Nicaragua](#), pay the flat 12.5% rate. USMCA-compliant goods and standard exemptions (Section 232 goods, informational materials, donations) do not incur the duty.

The USTR also concluded its Section 301 investigation into Brazil, leading to an [additional 25% tariff on essentially all Brazilian goods](#). USTR retained the proposed rate but broadened exemptions, adding pig iron, aluminium hydroxide, iron and steel scrap, certain wood products, and certain seafood. The action took effect on 22 July 2026.

The President also issued three proclamations imposing additional 50% ad valorem duties on Canadian goods under Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930. All three enter into force on 19 August 2026 and exclude articles already subject to Section 232 duties. The broadest covers [439 tariff lines of agricultural and industrial products](#). A second targets [52 lines of dairy products, sugars, syrups, and protein derivatives](#). The third covers [63 lines of alcoholic beverages and related goods](#). Each action responds to a specific Canadian policy.

The Federal Communications Commission added [foreign-produced power inverters and advanced robotic devices](#) to its Covered List, effective 28 July. Listed products can no longer receive new FCC equipment authorisations, which prevents new device models from [being marketed or sold in the United States](#).

Section 232 produced one new investigation, one closure, and one tariff cut. Commerce launched an investigation into [anthracite and metallurgical bituminous coal imports](#). The Bureau

of Industry and Security (BIS) will assess domestic production adequacy, import concentration, and foreign subsidies, and may recommend [tariffs or quotas](#). Findings are due to the President by around 26 March 2027. The process on commercial aircraft, jet engines, and parts concluded without tariffs. The President [directed the negotiation of agreements with trading partners](#) instead, on which Commerce and the USTR must report by 5 January 2027. The President reserved the right to consider alternative remedies later. BIS also [cut the Section 232 tariff on patented UK pharmaceuticals and ingredients from 10% to zero](#), effective 31 July 2026. The cut reflects British compliance with the Arrangement on Pharmaceutical Pricing. Because the pharmaceutical duties took effect the same day, the 10% rate never applied to any imports.

Contingent protection broadened in scope. Washington opened a [safeguard investigation into fresh, chilled, and frozen lamb meat](#) from all sources. Separately, the International Trade Administration initiated parallel [antidumping](#) and [countervailing](#) investigations into certain choline salts from China.

The United States also signed an [Agreement on Reciprocal Trade with Jordan](#), committing to preferential tariff treatment in future tariff actions. The document covers 3,554 tariff lines. Qualifying Jordanian goods will receive either the 2001 free trade agreement rate or the applicable most-favoured-nation rate. The commitment excludes antidumping, countervailing, safeguard, and Section 232 measures. The agreement enters into force 60 days after both parties complete internal ratification procedures.

Subsidies

The Department of Commerce signed letters of intent worth USD 874 million with seven compute supply chain companies under the CHIPS and Science Act. The United States takes a minority, non-controlling equity stake in each firm as a condition of the award. The largest commitment provides [up to USD 300 million to GlobalFoundries](#) for co-packaged optics for AI processors. [Kepler](#) follows with USD 245 million for 3D and ferroelectric AI memory. [Multibeam Corporation](#) received up to USD 140 million for advanced chip packaging and stacking.

Commerce also signed a Direct Funding Agreement committing [up to USD 225 million to Robert Bosch Semiconductor](#). The award supports a USD 2 billion conversion of Bosch's Roseville, California facility into a silicon carbide semiconductor production site. Funding also flowed to research and defence manufacturing. The Administration announced [USD 5 billion for the Genesis Mission](#), the AI-enabled scientific research initiative established by Executive Order in November 2025. Stated priorities span health, infrastructure and affordable energy, industrial strength, scientific discovery, and protection from emerging threats. Separately, the Department of War's Office of Strategic Capital committed a [conditional loan of up to USD 820 million to Performance Drone Works](#). The loan is intended to establish high-volume domestic manufacturing capacity for critical drone components.

The Department of Agriculture launched the [USD 500 million Fertilizer Investment & Expansion for Long-Term Domestic Supply \(FIELDS\) programme](#). Grants will fund the construction, purchase, and modernisation of domestic fertiliser production facilities, including equipment upgrades and pre-development costs.

Other Measures: Procurement and Sanctions

Public procurement rules tightened around sensitive defence materials. An Executive Order restricted [procurement waivers for materials](#) sourced from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. From 1 January 2027, waivers require contractors to submit approved mitigation plans for onshoring their supply chains. Covered materials include samarium-cobalt and neodymium-iron-boron magnets, tungsten, tantalum, and molybdenum.

OFAC revoked authorisation for Iranian petroleum trade. It replaced [General License X of 22 June 2026](#) and withdrew permission for the production, sale, delivery, and offloading of Iranian-origin crude oil, petrochemicals, and petroleum products.

China

During July 2026, China issued a series of national action plans under the 15th Five-Year Plan. Provincial and municipal governments launched further industrial investment funds, while Beijing tightened export controls. The GTA team documented 77 new interventions..

Export Restrictions

The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) [added 14 European Union entities to China's Export Control List](#), barring exports of dual-use items to them. The listed firms include Rheinmetall AG, TATRA TRUCKS, IHC Merwede Holding, and Vigo Photonics. MOFCOM presented the move as a response to the EU's 21st sanctions round against Russia, where Chinese companies were targeted

Separately, MOFCOM imposed a [temporary ban on helium exports](#) under HS code 2804.29.0010. The notice set no removal date, stating only that further adjustments would be announced separately.

Subsidies

Several national frameworks elaborated the 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP) adopted in March 2026. On climate change, the State Council adopted the [Action Plan for Carbon Peaking](#), creating a National Low-Carbon Transition Fund and green finance incentives. The NDRC and National Energy Administration adopted an [action plan for renewable energy](#), targeting wind, photovoltaic, and offshore power bases. Three weeks later, Beijing launched the [climate change action plan](#) backing carbon capture research. On local consumption, the State Council approved the [15th FYP for Expanding Consumption](#), covering catering, tourism, and automobiles. A further plan supported the [traditional Chinese medicine sector](#), covering manufacturing, R&D, and medical devices.

Interministerial guidelines directed support toward specific sectors. Nine ministries adopted [retail industry guidelines](#). It calls for loan interest discounts and other financial support for digital transformation across purchasing, storage, logistics, and distribution. Four ministries adopted rules to support the development of ["internet fundamental resources"](#), directing increased funding toward artificial intelligence and blockchain projects.

Five subnational governments launched or proposed industrial investment funds worth USD 3.3 billion. Shenzhen announced the largest, a [USD 1.5 billion fund](#) for semiconductors, integrated circuits, AI, and smart terminals. Yunnan's [USD 738.1 million sci-tech innovation parent fund](#) remains in consultation until 12 August 2026 and will [invest directly through equity stakes](#).

Chongqing's Yongchuan district launched a [USD 443.1 million fund](#) financed by three state-owned enterprise groups, taking [stakes](#) in its "3322" manufacturing cluster. Hunan's [USD 442.9 million future industry fund](#) targets AI and the low-altitude economy. Finally, Shaanxi's [USD 161.8 million technology transfer fund](#) invests in new materials, advanced manufacturing, and next-generation information technology.

Guangzhou and Zhuhai adopted grant packages concentrated on robotics and smart manufacturing. Guangzhou's Tianhe district will support the [embodied AI robot industry](#) from August 2026 to December 2030. It offers up to USD 14.7 million annually for research, development, and core technology breakthroughs. A further [USD 29.4 million per year](#) will cover the computing power needs of robot enterprises. Zhuhai grants up to USD 1.5 million per [industrial technological transformation project](#). The city also offers [up to USD 0.7 million per pilot-level smart factory](#) and [up to USD 1.5 million per innovation carrier](#).

European Union

The EU adopted its 21st sanctions package against Russia. Member States channelled substantial subsidies towards semiconductors, hydrogen and offshore wind. The GTA team documented 103 new interventions by the EU and its member states.

Export Restrictions

As part of its 21st sanctions package against Russia, Brussels [broadened the prohibition on providing liquefied natural gas terminal services](#) to Russian-linked entities. The ban now reaches any entity more than 50% owned or controlled by Russian persons, wherever established. It applies from 1 January 2027. In parallel, the EU [introduced a notification obligation for sales of LNG tanker vessels](#) to third countries. Sellers must report the identities of both parties and the vessel's IMO number.

The EU also [added 51 entities to the dual-use export ban list](#). The listed firms sit in Russia, China, Hong Kong, Türkiye, Kyrgyzstan, India, Kazakhstan and the United Arab Emirates. None may obtain an exception from the ban.

Import Restrictions

Transatlantic tensions continued to ease. Brussels agreed to [extend indefinitely the suspension of the rebalancing duties on certain aircraft and other American products](#), imposed in November 2020 over subsidies to Boeing. Later in the month, the Commission also [suspended, without a fixed expiry date, the package of rebalancing measures](#) adopted in July 2025.

The EU [banned imports of certain metals, chemicals and minerals from Russia](#) as part of its 21st sanctions package. The prohibition covers 25 CN codes, including ores, glassware and vehicle parts. Contracts concluded before 24 July 2026 may still be performed until 25 October 2026. Conversely, Brussels [narrowed the import ban on tanned or dressed furskins](#) by excluding sable from its scope.

Trade defence activity concentrated entirely on Chinese goods. The Commission opened antidumping investigations into [solid glass microspheres](#), [meat of Pekin duck](#), [primary alkaline manganese dioxide batteries](#) and [certain polyether polyols](#). VARTA lodged the battery complaint, while BASF, Covestro, PCC Rokita, Shell and Chimcomplex applied in the polyols case. Final determinations in the duck and battery investigations are due by July 2027.

Subsidies

Brussels expanded funding at the Union level. It [reformed the Research Fund for Coal and Steel](#), raising its annual allocation to USD 137 million for 2027-2034. Co-funding rates rise to 70% for industry participants and 100% for SMEs and non-profits. The EIB Group separately [committed up to USD 1.4 billion to the second phase of the European Tech Champions Initiative](#). The anchor investment targets a fund of funds of up to EUR 15 billion for European scaleups.

The [Action Plan on cybersecurity and artificial intelligence](#) will also increase available funding at the Union level. It launches an EU Grand Challenge on AI-assisted vulnerability remediation. It also pilots a Critical Open Source Resilience Campaign and opens AI Factories' compute capacity for cyber resilience work.

Energy and emissions reductions dominated state aid clearances, led by France's [USD 72 billion offshore wind](#) scheme. The 25-year two-way contract for difference covers eleven farms totalling up to 11.1 GW. Czechia launched a [market-wide electricity capacity mechanism worth at least USD 3.5 billion](#) until September 2036. Ireland deployed [USD 343.9 million for compensating energy-intensive companies](#) for electricity costs, conditional on reinvesting half the aid in modernised assets. Italy pursued the same objective through the [EUR 1.5 billion budget increase](#) of its ETS indirect emission cost compensation scheme.

Industrial support schemes split between hydrogen and semiconductors. France disclosed the beneficiaries of the production support scheme for decarbonised hydrogen electrolysis. Three beneficiaries share the 15-year fixed premium: [Engie Solutions H2](#), [Elyse Energy](#), and [Fertighy](#). Germany unveiled a [USD 403.9 million grant to Element 3-5 GmbH](#) for a silicon carbide epi-wafer plant. A further [USD 245 million went to Vishay Siliconix Itzehoe](#) co-funded by [Schleswig-Holstein](#), to expand metal-oxide-semiconductor output serving electric vehicles and renewable energy systems.

Member States also drew on the Middle East Crisis Temporary State Aid Framework. Sweden granted [USD 169.2 million to agricultural, fishing and aquaculture companies](#) facing higher fuel and fertiliser prices. Spain instead added [USD 341.9 million to its existing road transport scheme](#), lifting the total to USD 798.7 million. Both schemes expire on 31 December 2026.

EIB Group operations mobilised funding across SME finance, hydrogen and defence. In Spain, the [EIB signed a USD 546.5 million securitisation with Banco Santander](#). The [EIF added roughly USD 468 million](#) to the same transaction. The EIF also concluded a [USD 228.1 million securitisation with CaixaBank](#). In Germany, it signed a [USD 319.6 million loan guarantee with abcfinance](#) covering vehicles, machinery and equipment. Together with the National Bank of Greece, it signed a [USD 228.1 million facility for Greek SMEs and mid-caps](#) in the defence supply chain. In Austria, the EIB signed a [USD 514 million loan with OMV](#) for a 140 MW green hydrogen electrolyser.

Three national plans targeted fertilisers and critical minerals. France published [a USD 2.3 billion industrial investment programme for decarbonised nitrogen fertilisers](#) over ten years. Sweden [launched a national minerals strategy](#) and declared the sector a security issue. It allocates USD 34.5 million to mineral research over 2025-2028 alongside simplified permitting.

Other Measures: Sanctions

The 21st package extended the frozen funds list well beyond Russia. The EU [added 161 Russian entities](#) spanning banking, energy, mining, military-industrial production, electronics and shipping, plus [a steel producer in occupied Donbass](#). Third-country designations covered [an Indian shipping company, two Emirati firms and three tanker managers in China, Singapore and Oman](#). Financial restrictions reached 33 further Russian banks and a spread of third-country intermediaries. The package [barred transactions with 33 further Russian credit institutions and 11 non-EU crypto and payment firms](#) in Georgia, Belarus, Panama and elsewhere. It added [six institutions in Mongolia, India, Kyrgyzstan and Nigeria, five Emirati oil-trading entities and CJSC Eco-Islamic Bank](#). From 25 August 2026, the [ban on Russian ownership of EU crypto firms](#) extends to all crypto-asset services. The Council may also now [prohibit dealings with every crypto provider in a designated third country](#).

Transport and refining infrastructure also came under sanctions. The EU [prohibited transactions with two Russian ports and four Russian airports](#). It [forbade port access and related services to 41 vessels](#) contributing to Russia's warfare against Ukraine. A new listing category [targets refineries processing Russian-origin crude](#), with Georgia's Kulevi Oil Refinery the sole entry so far. That prohibition applies from 25 January 2027.

Other Regions

The GTA documented 685 developments announced by jurisdictions outside the US, China, and the European Union in the last four weeks. Significant developments include:

Argentina advanced investment incentives and trade defence. Buenos Aires granted incentives to three projects under the Incentive Regime for Large Investments (RIGI in Spanish). The beneficiaries were Pampa Energía's [Rincón de Aranda shale oil project](#), [Liex SA's lithium carbonate project](#) at Salar Tres Quebradas, and [Vicuña Argentina SA's copper, gold and silver mine](#). Moreover, the government opened an [antidumping investigation on industrial steel wind towers](#) from China.

Australia initiated an [antidumping investigation on certain steel flat bars](#) from Chinese Taipei. The application was lodged by InfraBuild NSW Pty Limited on behalf of the Australian industry.

Bangladesh increased export support for textiles and created a regional agroindustrial zone. Bangladesh Bank [increased its tax-based support on textile exports](#) from 1.5% to 5%, until 30 June 2027, tightening it to [domestic sourcing of yarn and fabric](#). The central bank also announced a [USD 242 million refinance fund](#) for a special agro-based economic zone in the Rajshahi and Rangpur divisions.

Brazil enhanced industrial credit and imposed new import restrictions. On credit, FINEP launched the [USD 1.9 billion Move Agrícola line](#) for agricultural equipment. Financing is [contingent on buying machinery of national content](#) from over 113 approved domestic suppliers. The government also [widened eligibility for state loans under the Sovereign Brazil Plan](#) to agricultural, forestry, fishing and mineral exporters. Furthermore, GECEX [raised duties on seven iron and steel products to 25%](#) until July 2027. Brasilia further initiated antidumping investigations on [carbon steel circular welded line pipes](#) from China and on [liquid and crystalline sorbitol](#) from China and India.

Canada deployed state capital for critical minerals processing and awarded defence contracts subject to local business commitments. The Canada Growth Fund injected [USD 282.9 million into Teck Resources Limited](#) to expand its production capacity. General Dynamics Land Systems Canada secured a [USD 1.4 billion contract](#) for 190 armoured combat support vehicles, [conditional on Canadian business activity equal to the contract value](#). Ottawa additionally named Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems the [preferred supplier for its Patrol Submarine Project](#), also subject to a [binding local business activity plan](#).

Chinese Taipei's Department of Investment Review cleared 20 investment cases across two committee rounds, four inbound and sixteen outbound. Among the cleared outbound investments are TSMC's [USD 20 billion in TSMC Arizona](#) for a wafer fabrication and advanced packaging plant and Lite-On's [USD 919 million into its US arm](#) for optoelectronics and server power supplies. On the inbound side, Denmark's Orsted Wind Power TW Holding to [lend TWD USD 1.3 billion to its Northwest Changhua vehicle](#) was approved, as well as the Netherlands' MIT Hai Long Wind Power request to [raise Yushan Energy's capital by USD 1.1 billion](#).

Egypt raised the export tax for zinc raw [dust, powders and flakes](#) from USD 137.4 to USD 196.32 per tonne. It covers products under HS 7903 and took effect on 15 July 2026.

The **Eurasian Economic Union** eased duties on industrial inputs and opened a new trade defence case. It [eliminated import duties on certain ethers and N-methylaniline](#) until 30 June 2027 and [on optical glass rods](#) until the end of 2027. The bloc also initiated an [antidumping investigation on Chinese imports of combined multilayer packaging material](#).

India pursued electronics and semiconductor subsidies, selective tariff relief, higher fuel export taxes and a wave of trade defence cases. The government approved the [Mobile Phone Manufacturing Scheme](#), worth approximately USD 6.5 billion. In addition, New Delhi approved [Semicon 2.0](#), an upcoming USD 13.2 billion programme spanning design, fabs, materials and packaging. Regarding imports, the Ministry of Finance exempted import duties on [inputs for inductor coil modules](#), granting [tax relief to those manufacturers](#). It extended [similar concessions on capital goods for all lithium-ion cells](#). Conversely, it imposed an [import licensing requirement on suspension grade PVC resin](#). India further announced it would [permit 100% FDI in inventory-based e-commerce for exports](#). On trade defence, the authorities opened antidumping investigations on [carbon raiser made of anthracite coal](#), [cyanuric chloride](#), [electric tractors](#), [moulded soda-lime glass vials](#), and [polyethylene terephthalate film above 100 microns](#) from China and other trading partners.

Iran continued to unwind the blanket food export ban imposed in [March 2026](#). It issued [exemption lists covering 12 product categories](#) as well as [sausages and similar meat products](#). The export of [bovine semen](#), [pulse residues](#), [medicinal plants](#), [certain sugars](#) and [chicken meat](#) is allowed but subject to prior authorisation.

Japan announced support of up to [USD 998 million for Tower Semiconductor Japan LLC](#). The funding backs a JPY 600 billion investment in domestic semiconductor production capacity.

Jordan signed the United States-Jordan Agreement on Reciprocal Trade on 21 July 2026. Under the agreement, Amman [committed to allow and facilitate US investment](#) in critical minerals, energy and infrastructure services on terms no less favourable than for domestic investors. Jordan further committed to [eliminate the special tax on new US-produced motor vehicles](#) meeting the FTA rules of origin, a levy currently set at 51% for petrol cars.

Kenya imposed a new insurance localisation requirement and eased rice import duties. Nairobi required all importers to obtain [marine cargo insurance from locally licensed insurers](#) before customs clearance. Separately, the National Treasury reportedly authorised the [duty-free importation of up to 490'000 tonnes of Grade 1 milled white rice](#) until 30 November 2026.

Mexico committed [to align its dual-use export control lists with those of the United States](#). The government called for adopting and maintaining additional US controls promptly upon written notification from Washington.

Morocco's [Gotion Power secured finance worth USD 113.7 million](#) from the African Development Bank. The loan will finance an integrated lithium iron phosphate battery plant.

Pakistan recalibrated import charges as part of its 2026 Budget. The Ministry of Finance and Revenue [reduced the additional customs duty](#) on more than 3'000 eight-digit tariff lines. It also [lowered the regulatory duty](#) on over 500 products. Conversely, the regulatory duty on [aluminium table, kitchen and household products](#) rose from 2.5% to 4%.

The **Philippines** established the [USD 976.7 million Electric Vehicle Incentive Strategy](#). The scheme grants non-transferable Tax Payment Certificates to manufacturers of electric vehicles and parts, capped at USD 244.17 million per enrolled model.

Russia combined export and import measures, industrial subsidies, and procurement restrictions. On trade, the government [raised the sunflower oil export duty](#) from USD 42 to USD 98.9 per tonne and on [sunflower meal from zero to USD 3.99 per tonne](#). The ban on gasoline exports was extended until 31 January 2027, both for [producers](#) and [all other exporters](#). For diesel fuel, marine fuel, and other gas oils, the export ban was extended until 31 August 2026 for [producers](#), and until 31 January 2027 for [all other exporters](#). Conversely, it further [exempted additional technological equipment from import VAT](#). The Ministry of Industry and Trade granted an [interest payment subsidy](#) on a USD 677.5 million VTB Bank loan to Novostal-M. The loan was further backed by VEB.RF with a [USD 262.6 million guarantee](#). Moreover, Moscow added electrical equipment to its [public procurement ban, restriction and minimum-quota lists](#), with Russian-origin quotas of 80% or 85%.

South Korea channelled state finance to exporters and refiners, and started two antidumping cases against China. The Export-Import Bank of Korea announced a [USD 192 million ultra-low interest loan](#) for SMEs affected by high exchange rates and the Middle East conflict. The Ministry of Industry and Trade established a scheme to [compensate petroleum refiners for losses under the maximum petroleum price regime](#). K-SURE extended [USD 100 million to CJ ENM USA](#). Korea Development Bank approved concessional loans under the Advanced Strategic Industry Fund, including one worth [USD 838 million to LG Display](#) for a next-generation OLED facility in Paju. On trade defence, Seoul initiated antidumping investigations on [Chinese imports of polyvinyl chloride suspension resin](#) and [tin mill products](#).

The **Southern African Customs Union** raised customs duties and opened a steel safeguard case. It raised customs duties on [parts for rock drilling equipment](#) from zero to 20%. It also changed the duty on [smooth and other peanut butter](#) from USD 0.00059/kg to an ad valorem rate of 20%. Imports from the EU, the UK, EFTA and SADC remain exempt in both cases.

Thailand's Board of Investment approved bundled incentives to several projects. The approvals include Datasection for a [USD 235.2 million GPU server infrastructure](#), Doosan for a [USD 180.2 million copper-clad laminate](#) plant, Union Technology for a [USD 189.2 million laminate serving](#)

[AI servers](#), Nestlé for a [USD 688 million smart factory](#), and Mazda for a [USD 221.6 million hybrid vehicle production](#) through the AutoAlliance joint venture. Every approval carries corporate tax exemptions, as well as import duty waivers on machinery and inputs.

Türkiye raised import surveillance requirements, unveiled a defence technology programme, and lifted a wheat export restriction. The Ministry of Trade introduced import licenses on four products, effective 10 August 2026. Surveillance certificates will be required for [coated wire](#), [stainless steel sinks and wash basins](#), [engine pistons](#), and [combine harvester parts](#). Regarding subsidies, the Ministry of Industry and Technology announced the HIT Innovative Defence Technologies Call, worth USD 5 billion. Applicants investing at least USD 42 million may receive [corporate tax support of up to 60% of the investment](#) and [grants covering up to 20% of costs](#). The call also offers [soft financing of up to 70%](#), [allocated investment land](#), and [public procurement support](#). Finally, the Turkish Grain Board [removed export restrictions on bread wheat and broken wheat](#). Those restrictions had been in place since March 2025.

The **United Kingdom** expanded export and business finance, completed the nationalisation of its steel sector and initiated a new antidumping investigation. UK Export Finance (UKEF) launched a [USD 66 billion Defence Export Fund](#), offering loans and guarantees to British defence exporters and, potentially, foreign government buyers. UKEF also signed a [USD 1 billion framework loan with GE Aerospace](#) to finance airline engine overhauls at its Welsh and Scottish sites. The British Business Bank agreed an [ENABLE Guarantee of up to USD 463 million with DF Capital](#) to support inventory finance for smaller firms. On steel, the government [took British Steel into public ownership](#), removing China's Jingye Group as owner under the Steel Industry (Nationalisation) Act 2026. Moreover, London initiated an [antidumping investigation on linear low density polyethylene](#) from the United States.

Written by Fiama Angeles and Ana Elena Sancho.

With the input of Marius Risse, Halit Harput, Chintan Jadwani, Andrey Eydlin, Vladislav Alifirov, Federica Miriani, Anttoni Asikainen, Nurmalia Mahmuda, Sisi Tang and Yiannos Lazzarotto.
